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Plato and so on. A Dialogue on Philosophical Dialogues  
 
Abstract: What have Plato's, Hume's and Wittgenstein's dialogues in common? And what can 
we learn from this question for our understanding of Wittgenstein? – This paper is a transcript 
of a lecture given in Bergen on May 4th, 2001. 
 
 
 
Motto: „Wird Christus tausendmal zu Bethlehem geboren und nicht in dir, du bleibst ewig 
verloren“ (Angelus Silesius) 
 
I start with telling you part of the story of what I did on that sunny Friday, 2 weeks ago, when I 
received my “prøveforelesnings-theme”. After having been handed the title of my lecture at the 
Faculty’s office  … I went for a walk to the tax-office in the centre of Bergen, to deliver my 
“selvangivelse” (tax-declaration). You might be surprised, but this was carefully planned 
beforehand, because I had foreseen that I would want to air my head after the important event 
of finally getting to know the theme of the “prøveforelesning”. Now I would have two weeks to 
prepare. And I started with preparation right away. Walking, I collected ideas, and from time to 
time I sat down in order to make notes. 
 
Among the first questions which I asked myself was this: Are there any books dealing with 
my theme? Of course, there were many books. Having arrived at my office, I found such a 
book in my own library: There was this book, called “Philosophical dialogues: Plato, Hume, 
Wittgenstein”, edited by Timothy Smiley (Philosophical Dialogues: Plato, Hume, 
Wittgenstein. Dawes Hicks Lectures on Philosophy. Edited by Timothy Smiley. Oxford 
University Press 1996. Contributions by David Sedley on Plato, Jonathan Dancy on Hume, 
Jane Heal on Wittgenstein). I had actually quoted that book in my thesis, but I was 
acquainted only with its part on Wittgenstein. Actually, I had forgotten that there was also 
something about Plato and Hume in it. It contained an entire article, dealing exclusively with 
a dialogue by David Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. I remembered then a 
remark by a colleague: He had said, that the dialogical structure of Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations, as I had presented it in my thesis, reminded him of the structure 
of this dialogue by Hume, with its main figures Philo, Cleanthes and Demea. That was 
something to hold on to! 
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 So, didn’t I now have a good theme? There was still an important decision to make: Shall I first 
read what this book says about Plato and Hume – or shall I just stick to myself and first develop 
my ideas properly  before they would get spoiled by the work of others? Always a tricky thing, 
isn’t it? One wants both, originality and quality. Trying not to let oneself be influenced by the 
thought of others, one risks to redoing what others already have done, or going in to a blind 
alley, which might have been prevented, if one had only listened to the voice of the others. 
Submerging oneself in secondary literature one is strangely exposed to the same and the 
reverse danger, although for different reasons, and moreover doing that can form your thoughts 
in such a way that you have difficulties freeing yourself again when you want to. And poor you 
if it was fixing you the wrong way. 
 
But this book on philosophical dialogues seemed “safe”: I would manage to keep a sort of cool 
attitude towards it. It couldn’t hurt to study what it says on Plato’s and Hume’s dialogues. After 
all, I had had no problems digesting that  part of the book  which was on Wittgenstein; that had 
not taken me by surprise.  And didn’t I know that the best recipe for successful writing and 
thinking would always be a kind of dialogue – a dialogue between my own thoughts and the 
thoughts of others. This dialogue had after all to start somewhere. After that it would continue 
in the forms of the “hermeneutische Spirale”; and in this way it would make me both receptive 
and creative. 
 
In this context I remembered that, when reading again Stanley Cavell’s “Availability of 
Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy” (1962) the day before, I had had an interesting experience. 
Because I had felt that I had not been fair to Cavell in my thesis (“Wittgensteins Philosophische 
Untersuchungen: Vom Buch zum Album”, Bergen 2000); that what I had to say in my thesis 
about the different voices in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, had actually already 
somehow been contained in what was said by Cavell – and I felt a bit ashamed because I had 
not been fair. The new aspects which I had brought in to my thesis, e.g. the view that there 
were at least three voices at work in the “Investigations”, seemed now not much more than 
explications and applications of what Cavell 40 years earlier had said, when interpreting 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations as a dialogue of struggle between a voice of temptation and a 
voice of correctness. But I hadn’t been aware of this when writing on Cavell in my thesis. 
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Now comes the important thing: Reflecting on this experience it struck me that I had needed, 
with all my sincerity and authenticity,  to go through that misunderstanding of Cavell, in order 
to develop my “own” thoughts and to discover “new” things. And I had to experience all this  
in order to experience two years later that I had “underestimated” Cavell and only developed 
further his thoughts, only discovered things already known. This is somehow paradoxical: 
Sometimes we have to go through y in order to get x; but if we were given x right away, we 
wouldn’t have been in the position to receive it, since we were not prepared for it. My renewed 
dialogue with Cavell’s text had taken different turns this time.  The text told me more and 
different things than before, and I responded in a different way.  
 
You will forgive my rather long and personal introduction, but all this has to do with dialogue, 
and with philosophical dialogue. You understand: I feel encouraged by the title of my lecture to 
do exactly what I did: First, to communicate the inner dialogue that was going on with me 
when getting to know the subject of my lecture; second, to convey, that I see my reception of 
the theme itself in terms of a dialogue, with all the components which belong to that, like the 
notion of the context and the attention to the particulars and the specifics of the situation. From 
there, I wanted to point to the hopes and concerns which belong to a situation where one is 
asked to start a dialogue with a person, or a theme, or a book. And then, it was to let you know 
that I quite generally look upon reading and understanding as a process of dialogical exchange 
where evolution and learning are natural parts. Finally, I wanted to draw your attention to this 
very interesting fact, that sometimes one has the experience of having understood things 
wrongly before, but that one also sees that this “mistake” was crucial for being in the position 
to understand it “correctly” afterwards. Because, understanding “wrongly” before was right on 
the way – and not: in the way – for coming to understand “correctly” afterwards. So, making a 
mistake is part of learning. Considering this more thoroughly, the Wittgensteinians among you 
might recognize, where I am heading. I am driving at connecting all this with Wittgenstein’s 
method of therapy by letting the reader go through a dialogue: Wittgenstein makes the reader 
go through a process of learning via a dialogue in which he/she is asked to take an active part. 
 
When does Alois finally come to Plato? Isn’t he supposed to speak about him? 
 
Yes, I am, and I will try to do the best I can. I needn’t tell you, that I am in no way a scholar on 
Plato, but I hope to know enough to be allowed to say the things I want to say. Returning to the 
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work on my lecture, first I had to find a perspective which helped to focus my subject in 
concrete ways. With such a perspective I hoped to be able to relate what I had to say about 
Plato and other philosophers to my main concern, namely Wittgenstein and his Philosophical 
Investigations. Since I had that book with articles about Plato’s, Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s 
dialogues – what was more natural than bringing my subject together by connecting it in a 
comparison of the dialogues of those three philosophers? 
 
So, what was then the opening perspective  that should help me to get a good take on the 
subject? It was the very simple question: What did Plato, Hume and Wittgenstein want to 
achieve with their philosophies? This was at any rate a question that under no circumstances 
could be skipped when dealing with the role of dialogue in their philosophies. For I did not 
want to give you some sort of  “Oberflächen”-stylistics of dialogue, studying the length of 
remarks, counting questions and answers. Rather, I wanted a stylistics of philosophical 
behaviour, or philosophical program. Therefore, the starting questions are: What did 
Wittgenstein want? What did Hume want? What did Plato want? 
 
There is surely no simple answer to the question what Plato wanted, and this question is 
obviously much debated. Definitely, there is the question Where-is-Plato? which has no clear-
cut answer: Is Plato’s voice to be identified or assimilated with the voice of Socrates? And then 
there are questions like Does-Plato-mean-this-ironically? Assuming, we have found Plato’s 
voice, in what way do we have to understand this voice? What we think Plato wanted and what 
we think of the relationship of Plato to other philosophers will depend on the answers to these 
questions – and they are only a few of the critical questions, I assume. 
 
I have not mentioned yet that Plato is considered to be an enemy of writing, this on the basis 
perhaps of what he wrote (wrote!) in his Seventh letter. How was I to deal with that? Maybe 
one could develop from this point an argument for the oral dialogue and finally come to 
something like a view of Wittgenstein as the “orality-philosopher” (Kristóf Nyíri). The spoken 
word as opposed to the written: spontaneous, unfixed, demanding and developing attention and 
memory, open-textured, but not as open for misunderstanding as the de-contextualized written 
word, living, dialogical. Was this Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s message?  
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What about Hume? Why did Hume compose exactly this piece about religion in dialogue form? 
After all, he didn’t write in dialogues, usually! Did he think the dialogue was the literary genre 
most apt for expressing philosophical skepticism towards questions of religion? Was it settled 
which character in the Dialogues speaks for Hume? 
 
Finally, what about Wittgenstein? Why did Wittgenstein choose the form of dialogue for his 
Investigations, or at least make extensive use of certain elements of dialogue and dialectics 
there?  I think we could give several reasons: Like his personal character – then his conviction, 
that entities are relational, that facts are relational, and that humans are relational beings; that 
problems, both philosophical problems and personal problems, are always relational. What is 
more suitable to express relations with all their elements and functions than the language game 
– to misuse a Wittgensteinian expression – where relations have their natural place, the 
dialogue? 
 
Further, the dialogue is the elementary communication unit in daily life, and Wittgenstein was 
convinced that in order to solve philosophical problems we have to relate them to language use 
in daily life. There has been a lot of thinking about communication in this century, and people 
like Grice have defined communication principles: Do not state what you know to be false; Do 
not be obscure; Do not be ambiguous; Do not be messy, but observe some order; and others. It 
is interesting to note that Wittgenstein with his dialogues does not mind violating these rules; 
rather he wants to do justice to all the turns, imperfections and freedoms which characterise the 
conversations of real life. 
 
However, how clear are things with Wittgenstein? Even scholars, who have a rather 
straightforward and unproblematic attitude to Wittgenstein’s Investigations, think there are 
sometimes problems with identifying which voice in the Investigations speaks  for 
Wittgenstein, and which one for his “opponent”. How can we possibly know for sure what 
Wittgenstein wanted to achieve with his philosophy as long as we don’t know where to locate 
his voice? 
 
Reflecting on these questions and considering how far I had got at this point, I started to 
wonder: Wasn’t my starting point the assumption that, in order to being able to say something 
about Plato’s, Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s dialogues, I first had to find out what these 
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philosophers wanted with their philosophy, and with their dialogues? And now, the undertaking 
of finding answers to this question was disturbed by not getting clear about where to find the 
authoritative instance which could show me what the three philosophers wanted. And this was 
basically due to the fact that they wrote in the form of  dialogue. 
 
At this point I turned to the secondary literature. 
 
Plato: There seems to be some consensus on one thing, namely, the opinion that Plato 
throughout his philosophical career stood in for teaching doctrines, despite the fact that the 
doctrines changed in the course of his development, and despite the problem of clearly 
identifying the content of the doctrines. Michael Frede does not seem to be representative when 
stating that “Plato even in the least aporetic and most dogmatic dialogues remains at a radical 
distance from the views and arguments of the fictional characters of the dialogue” (Quoted 
from Sedley 1996:p.5). Quite the opposite; the common expert opinion seems to go with David 
Sedley who is “reluctant to believe that we have been entirely mistaken all these centuries to 
read off a ‘Platonist’ ethics, psychology or metaphysics” from his dialogues, and Sedley 
affirms Socrates as Plato’s “primary spokesman in the dialogues” (Sedley 1996:p.5). 
 
However, the conviction that Plato expresses his authorial views in the dialogues with the help 
of Socrates  is by no means a hindrance to acknowledging the tremendous stylistic and 
methodological richness and variety of content in Plato’s work, a theme, which is wonderfully 
sketched in the article by Sedley in that book on philosophical dialogues, edited by Smiley. 
Sedley discusses Plato’s highly sophisticated tactic with figures like Simmias and Cebes in the 
Phaedo, and he leaves no doubt that Plato’s dialogues are worth the most detailed scrutiny. But, 
at the same time, he strengthens the view that the dominant message of Plato’s texts is Plato’s 
message, no matter how many “fictive authors”, “Erzähler” or speakers we are able to find in 
the dialogues. This was after all also the opinion of Plato’s most important student, Aristotle: 
He had no scruple to attribute to Plato certain doctrines – and what an authority he is! 
Moreover, what is relevant for us here: Wittgenstein didn’t seem to have any doubts either 
when he criticized Socrates and Plato for their ideas and methodology. Therefore, one seems to 
be in good company when one concludes that Plato was a dogmatic in the classic Pyrrhonist 
sense: Somebody who claims to have found a truth and attempts to teach others this truth. This 
seems the task of Plato’s teaching and writing: To convince others of certain doctrines. For this 
6  
purpose, Plato introduced explicit figures in flesh and blood with a character, on whom he 
could display progress in learning – Wittgenstein never introduced such well-defined figures. 
No doubt, Plato’s undertaking was also combined with strategies similar to those which 
Wittgenstein employed, like making doubt and skepticism essential parts of the process of 
learning. According to Sedley, there is an important difference between the dialogue Meno and 
the dialogue Phaedo: In the first “we needed Socrates to show us that we knew nothing, so that 
we could then proceed to seek out the truth”; whereas doubt in the second is not “prior to 
discovery, but part of the discovery process itself … Doubts must not be suppressed, or they 
will subvert rational belief. They are like a frightened child inside us, who needs to be charmed 
out of his fears” (Sedley 1996:p.21). Still, what follows the doubts in Plato, is “the right 
arguments to quell them” (21); and then we remain with their consequences as doctrines. 
 
Isn’t Alois being a little bit unfair? Isn’t there much more in common to Plato and Wittgenstein 
than he is willing to acknowledge? Think of Socratic irony, think of the maieutic techne, think 
of the importance of method in Socrates’ work, think of Socrates himself:  clearly, for Socrates 
philosophy was not only doctrines, but a way of life. No doubt, these are very important 
elements also for Wittgenstein. Socrates is a master of the art to help others give birth to their 
ideas. Wittgenstein is a master of philosophical psychoanalysis: to make his patient give birth 
to the philosophical problems with which he or she has been pregnant so long – to bring it then 
out on the surface and show where they originate from. But still, Wittgenstein is different. 
Socrates seems never perplexed by the questions he raises, Wittgenstein is. Socrates knows 
nothing because he considers himself not knowing enough, not being enough an expert; 
Wittgenstein thinks that with philosophical problems there can in the end be no expert except 
the person who gets rid of the questions themselves. Socrates has the last auctorial word. Who 
has the auctorial word in the Investigations? I have touched upon this question before. 
 
It might very well be that I am not entirely just to Plato. It is probable that I have 
oversimplified. Let me therefore give my discussion of Plato a touch of fallibility. I would like 
to quote for you a passage from an article by Brumbaugh which presents Plato in a rather more 
complex picture than I have been giving here. Brumbaugh discusses the question, which one of 
Socrates’ biographers is most trustworthy: Aristophanes, Xenophon, or Plato? Brumbaugh says 
a conversation with a friend became most important: 
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… how far does one trust Plato, in spite of his claim to historicity? I had been 
discussing my reasons for rejecting all but two of the Letters attributed to Plato. It 
seemed incredible to me, I said, that so good a stylist would allow himself to appear in 
the roles of mystagogue, mendicant, rotarian, and plagiarist, which are the roles of the 
author(s) of Letters II, XIII, VI, and IX. Not at all, said my friend; the mark of a literary 
genius is to throw himself into those many roles; probably he believes that he is each of 
them when he is writing; but in any case, this variety of personae should count for, 
rather than against, the authenticity of the collection. And, in that case, of course, we 
might have to say the same thing about the role of biographer of Socrates as Plato 
played it; he may just have been acting when he claimed it was true history. 
 “My friend,” I said, “there is a quarrel from of old between philosophy and 
poetry; and you just renewed it.” (Robert S. Brumbaugh: “Criticism in Philosophy: 
Aristotle’s Literary Form”. Quoted from “Philosophical Style. An Anthology about the 
Writing and Reading of Philosophy”. Edited by Berel Lang. Chicago: 1980, p.309) 
 
If there is a quarrel between philosophy and poetry, then it is not settled, and Hume’s 
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion will be another example of it. Allow me therefore now 
to concentrate on Hume. 
 
Originally I had expected that my lecture would take roughly the following course: First I 
would show that Plato wants to teach doctrines (and I am the last one to criticise him for that), 
and that for this purpose he employs the dialogical style; then I show that Hume wants to 
convey that in questions of religion and theology it is wise to adopt at least a skeptical position, 
and with this objective in mind he would equip the characters of his dialogue with the 
necessary arguments to make the reader doubt the possibility of saying anything reasonable in 
these matters; and at the end I would show that Wittgenstein was very different from all this, 
that he didn’t want to leave the reader with any particular position, not even the position of 
skepticism. Rather, he wants to free us from our philosophical problems, and this involves 
dissolution of the problems and dissolution from all positions, not solution into a position. For, 
I think, if there was any conviction that Wittgenstein was willing to affirm over and over again, 
then it is the one that  a philosophical problem is a sort of mental illness. Treating philosophical 
problems is therefore like treating an illness, and the task of philosophy is therefore to make the 
problem disappear. Whether we agree with Wittgenstein or not, and we might just as well not 
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agree, this idea, I think, is truly Wittgenstein. But it would have been all too smooth if Hume’s 
Dialogues had fit into the scheme which I have just sketched.  
 
Philosophical Dialogues, the book which I have referred to already several times, contains an 
article by Jonathan Dancy which wipes clean any attempt to identify Hume with a particular 
voice in the dialogue, and thereby to try to access this work in a relatively direct and 
unproblematic way. Dancy states very clearly that the questions “Which character represents 
Hume? Which character carries the message Hume wants us to believe in? Cleanthes? Philo? 
…” are quite the wrong questions (Dancy 1996:p.33).  Rather, according to Dancy, Hume’s 
dialogue has no message, the only message being: I am not telling you anything. 
 
Dancy’s article is entitled “For Here the Author is Annihilated”, and that has made me aware 
that things with Hume are a bit complicated. The article is a masterpiece. Actually, I consider 
this article about Hume one of the best articles I have ever read about Wittgenstein, although 
Wittgenstein is, of course, not mentioned there with a single word. 
 
When finishing my thesis I was somehow happy to see Wittgenstein’s Investigations as 
polyphonic, multi-voiced, and I considered this already such an achievement that I took a rest 
there without developing that view further. Now, here came Dancy and had no scruples 
pointing out right at the beginning that there are many voices in Hume’s dialogue, and that 
Hume doesn’t identify with any of them. Dancy started off there where I had left the field. My 
first reaction was that I felt a bit lost; my ideas about the polyphony of the Investigations 
seemed all too vague, if not even confused. I almost didn’t know any longer what I should take 
them to mean. In the beginning of my lecture I talked about the experience  that in order to find 
the truth, sometimes one first has to go through imperfections instead of adopting truth right 
away. Because one has to fight for truth in a process of learning. I think my response to Dancy 
is such a case in question. The confusion which I felt about my polyphonic conception of 
Wittgenstein made me study Dancy’s article thoroughly, and this again allowed me to get a 
better view on Wittgenstein. 
 
Dancy sees four possible approaches or ways of dealing with the many voices in Hume’s 
dialogue. He considers all of them wrong, except the last. 
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(1) The first approach is the “camouflage”- or “self-concealment”-interpretation. Hume doesn’t 
want to show his own opinion in matters of religion. But it should be clear that from the three 
main figures it is the skeptic Philo who is chosen to represent Hume’s own views. However, 
Hume does a good job in attempting to destabilize this belief at several places. – Doesn’t this 
ring a bell for Wittgensteinians? Is it not reasonable to read the Investigations this way? 
Wittgenstein conceals himself, but it is really the schoolmaster-voice which pleads his, 
Wittgenstein’s, case and which finds its clearest expression in prohibitions and suppressions 
like “You cannot say: Only I know whether I am in pain or not”. Wittgenstein conceals himself 
partly because it wouldn’t serve the goal of therapy to enter the scene as the schoolmaster; that 
might simply be too offensive and intimidating. Kierkegaard says, “There is nothing that 
requires such gentle handling as an illusion, if one wishes to dispel it. If anything prompts the 
prospective captive to set his will in opposition, all is lost. And this is  what a direct attack 
achieves …” (Søren Kierkegaard: “The Point of View for My Work as an Author: A Report to 
History”. Translated by Walter Lowrie. Quoted from “Philosophical Style. An Anthology about 
the Writing and Reading of Philosophy”. Edited by Berel Lang. Chicago: 1980, p.67) Therefore 
Kierkegaard recommends the indirect method to free somebody from illusions. Liberation from 
illusions is definitely Wittgenstein’s task; but to replace them with a doctrine? – Dancy 
disapproves of the “camouflage”-reading of Hume – and I disapprove of such a reading of 
Wittgenstein. 
 
(2) Another possible approach is the “balance-interpretation”. “… the Dialogues offer us many 
voices – at least three, and perhaps more. More than one of these voices remain in play at the 
end, and as they remain in play, so the reader is expected [this in distinction from approach (1), 
A.P.] not to select one as the winner, but to move inexorably between them, seeing the point of 
each but rejecting none.” (Dancy 1996:p.35) So, one should not infer a doctrine from Hume’s 
dialogue, but rather simply refrain from taking any position. – Dancy dismisses this, inter alia 
by pointing out that Hume would never have wanted to leave the reader with such a result; 
Hume couldn’t possibly let the reader alone, with the game still in play! We can say, that 
approach (1) – the camouflage-approach – was dogmatic, whereas approach (2) – the balance-
approach – is the approach of the academic skeptic. Dancy thinks, that neither of the two fits 
Hume – nor does, in my view, either fit Wittgenstein. 
 
(3) The third, the “oscillation”-approach, sees – instead of many – only two voices at work, 
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between which the reader “oscillates”. “The two voices between which we oscillate are, on the 
one hand, a skeptical voice and on the other a natural tendency to infer a designer. Again, the 
suggestion is that the Dialogues, especially in Part XII, instantiate this oscillation, and that by 
the way they instantiate it they promote the same oscillation in the reader.” (Dancy 1996:p.40). 
In part 12 of the dialogue, Philo, although having argued previously against the validity of 
inferring a divine designer from design in the world, “recants”  and actually gives in to the 
force of the natural tendency to infer a designer. – Doesn’t this excellently fit the 
Investigations? Doesn’t Wittgenstein make us identify with a voice of mentalism or 
essentialism, force us to go along with it, confront us then with refutation via the schoolmaster 
voice, and hereby try to heal us, but let us  at another place  again fall back into the old trap of 
philosophical confusion, just in order to take the healing up again and again because the 
confusions are legion? 
 
Dancy has an argument against this approach, too. One reason is, that Hume – according to 
Dancy – clearly has an anti-religious purpose. He couldn’t allow the tendency to suppose a 
designer go endlessly on and still be present at the end of the dialogue. Dancy’s other reason is 
that the two-voices-picture does not in his view do justice to the “fluidity in the voices between 
which we are supposed to oscillate” (Dancy 1996:p.43). The voices do “shimmer” all too much 
for being restrainable to two streams. The fact is that we cannot identify any clear voice in that 
dialogue. We don’t know what Philo’s or any other figure’s position is; we cannot find any 
positive statement which is hold firmly, right to the end. 
 
(4) What is Dancy’s own approach, the one he accepts as correct? Now it gets really 
interesting. According to Dancy, Hume’s dialogue is composed in such a way that it is un-
interpretable, in the sense, that we cannot draw any clear message out of it. Therefore the 
reader is not in the position to construct any theory out of it. “The way in which the characters 
shimmer before us prevents us from establishing any doctrine as the message of the text.” 
(Dancy 1996:p.49); there are simply too many and too conflicting messages to be drawn from 
the text. “Everyone admits,” says Dancy, “that it is impossible to find one consistent and 
coherent message in the Dialogues” (Dancy 1996:p.52). – Upon getting no message from the 
text, the reader finds himself in a position acceptable to Hume: Every positive belief and 
attitude in these matters has been destroyed during the process of reading and trying to 
understand the dialogue; but at the end the reader doesn’t get anything back to fill the void. So 
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the reader is no longer capable of supposing a designer,  the tendency to do so  has been 
destroyed, or brought to silence  during the process of reading. The voice which was tempted to 
suppose a divine designer was confused and stopped. Dancy calls this approach the “causal” 
interpretation, because it causes the reader to abandon his original position. – Isn’t this 
Wittgenstein therapy pure and simple? 
 
I do not know how far approach (4) is applicable to Wittgenstein’s Investigations. Five years 
ago I produced a small text in which I gave expression to my difficulties inferring any clear and 
coherent or even consistent message from sections 1-4 of Philosophical Investigations 
(“Wittgensteins Philosophische Untersuchungen: Zur Textgenese von PU §§1-4”. Working 
Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen No 14, 1997, p.107ff). 
Already that small portion of text contained many skandaloi which seemed to render 
impossible my attempt to understand coherently. Therefore, approach (4) seems very tempting. 
 
I see two main roads leading from here: 1. First: I can hold on to the view, which I had  before I 
read Dancy, and which is roughly the following: Wittgenstein’s Investigations is polyphonic. 
But saying this is not to negate the all-important role of that specific voice in the Investigations, 
which constantly points the reader to the practice in which our thinking and speaking is 
embedded. The reader – Wittgenstein’s philosophical patient – is endlessly in danger of falling 
back to old confusion  or giving in to further confusion, and he is constantly healed by 
Wittgenstein with a liberating new perspective. The goal of therapy is to secure our stand in the 
“rough”, but known  and therefore safe  grounds of daily life and practice. Therapy has to go on 
and on, and therefore it needs the dialogue. 
 
Interestingly, I come back to Plato at this point, and it is a Plato different from the one I have 
presented to you at the beginning: Walter Pater – and I am grateful to Ralph Jewell for this 
reference – contrasts the treatise of Aristotle and Spinoza with the dialogue of Plato. About the 
latter he says that it does – in opposition to the first – not “provide a proposition, nor a system 
of propositions”, but that it “forms a temper”. Hence, Plato’s dialogues do not want to give you 
doctrines, rather, they are “like that long dialogue with oneself, that dialectic process, which 
may be co-extensive with life”. In the same way we can say of the therapy of Wittgenstein, that 
it may go on for your entire life, that it tries to change the person, not the arguments, that it 
tries to form a temper, not a theory. Basically, it wants to teach the philosopher the same 
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receptive attitude which Pater attributes to Plato’s understanding listener: a mood which is not 
dogmatic but open for learning and surprises. (Ralph Jewell: “Walter Pater’s Plato and 
Platonism”. In: Grekerne og vi. Edited by Vigdis Songe-Møller. Skriftserien fra Filosofisk 
institutt ved Universitetet i Bergen No 19, 2000, p.112) 
 
Second. Above I hinted to a more specific way of dealing with Dancy’s approach (4) when it 
comes to Wittgenstein. This is my second road: Adopting and adapting this approach to the 
Investigations leads to the result, that at the end of this work even the voice of practice seems to 
have gone; there is nothing left but a silence. 
 
However, there will always be those of us who are not happy with this result. It doesn’t even 
seem to be a proper result: We have not received any clear message! 
 
We want more, and since we didn’t find the message in the text, we might just as well … step 
outside and look into all it’s author’s works and life. Maybe we find a message there. It is 
remarkable that Dancy throughout his article seems to know for sure what Hume really wanted, 
e.g. when he says: “What I am left looking for is an interpretation which respects as far as 
possible the anti-religious purpose I ascribe to Hume …” (Dancy 1996:p.45). Dancy knows this 
from extra-textual sources. What do we know of Wittgenstein’s purpose with Philosophical 
Investigations? I dare to say that we have to be open to investigating the entirety of 
Wittgenstein’s life and work in order to find a good answer to that question. Without studying 
the context of this work  we won’t be able to answer its invitations and challenges properly. As 
the message of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus – at least according to some scholars – had first to be 
found outside the Tractatus in a personal letter to von Ficker, the message of the Investigations 
might not be contained in the work itself. The work might actually want us to step outside. 
 
Whether we want to follow up this invitation, and continue to look for the message in other 
places, or not: With approach (4) we may have discovered a striking parallel between the 
Tractatus and the Investigations. While the Tractatus can be seen to be a monologue, the 
Investigations can be seen to be a dialogue. But both can be seen to end in silence. 
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